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The following outline illustrates the materials discussed in the 1954,
1956 and 1958 biennial Florida constitutional law articles. Subjects
followed by an asterisk (*) have been transferred, in whole or in part,
to other articles in the 1960 Florida Law Survey. Subjects followed by two
asterisks (*") have not been discussed, since the decisions involved did





SUBSTANTIVEI DUE PROCESS - TI-E POLICE POVER
1. BIUSINESsEs AFFECTED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST
11. ZomNNc*




A. Health, Safety and Morals
B. Generally
*Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Miami,
1. Volumes 96 through 112, Southern Reporter, second series.




















STATE FUNDS AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE*
IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT"
LEGISLATION REQUIREMENTS'*




The present article analyzes selected decisions disposing of Florida
constitutional issues; Florida court interpretation of United States consti-
tutional phraseology is generally omitted.
Court decisions2 and legislative reapportionment 3 battles presently form
an atmosphere in which comprehensive constitutional reform in Florida
2. E.g., Rivcra-Cruz v. Cray, 104 So.2d 501 (Fla, 1958).
3. The problem of fair political representation is still characterized by federal and
Florida courts as "political," rather than "judicial" in nature.
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Effect of Governor's Absence from the State -The Governor requested
an opinion of the justices of the Florida Supreme Court on whether his
contemplated absence from the state for thirty days would cause a
devolution of his powers and duties upon the President of the Senate.
Article IV, section 19, reads as follows:
In case of the impeachment of the Governor, his removal from
office, death, resignation or inability to discharge his official duties,
the powers and duties of the Governor shall devolve upon the
President of the Senate for the residue of the term, or until the
disability shall cease ...
The Justices interpreted "inability" to mean "unable," "lack of ability,"
or "capacity." Absence from the state for a temporary period of time,
therefore, would not trigger the terms of Article IV, section 19. 11 view
of the Governor's statement that his absence involved a trip to Russia
as Chairman of the National Governors' Conference and his assurance
that lie would "be in direct communication" with his staff and "subject
to prompt . . . return should the occasion demand," the opinion of the
justices seems very reasonable.5
Time within which to Act upon Legislative Bills-The Legislature,
during its regular biennial session, extended its session a stipulated period
of days. Article III, section 28 provides that:
Every bill . . . shall, before becoming a law, be presented to the
Governor. . . . If any bill shall not be returned within five days
after it shall have been presented to the Governor . . . the same
shall be a law. . . . If the Legislature, by its final adjournment
prevent such action, such bill shall be a law, unless the Governor
within twenty (20) days after the adjournment, shall file such
bill with his objections thereto, in the office of the Secretary
of State ...
The Governor requested the opinion of the Justices as to whether lie
would have twenty days, after the terminal date of the extended legislative
session, within which to act upon bills reaching him during the last
five days of the extended session. Article III, section 28, was applied by
the Justices to the extended session; therefore, the Governor received an
affirmative answer to his question.0
Governor's Power to Call the Legislature into Extraordinary Session
to Reapportion -Article VII, section 3, states that:
4. The Florida Constitution Committee of the Florida Bar is studying yet another
draft; the Committee's next meeting will be held at Stetson Law School this fall.
5. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 112 So.2d 843 (Fla. 1959). Cf. State
v. Cray, 74 So,2d 114 (Fla, 1954).
6. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 95 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1957).
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The Legislature that shall meet in regular session A.D. 1925,
and those that shall meet every ten years thereafter, shall apportion
the Representation in the Senate . . . and, at the same time . . .
also apportion the Representation in the House. . . Should the
Legislature fail to apportion . . . at any regular session of the
Legislature at any of the times herein designated, it shall be the
duty of the Legislature or Legislatures succeeding such regular
session . either in special or regular session, to apportion ....
In the event the Legislature shall fail to reapportion ... the
Governor shall (within thirty days after the adjournment of the
regular session), call the Legislature together in extraordinary
session to consider the question of reapportionment ...
The regular 1955 session failed to see reapportionment materialize and
the Governor, under Article VII, section 3, called the Legislature into
extraordinary session to reapportion. During that session the Legislature
failed to enact a bill reapportioning the Senate. The 1957 regular and
extended sessions likewise failed to reapportion representation in the
Senate. However, the last session did see creation of a joint-house committee
to study constitutional revision, which would include the reapportionment
problem.
The Governor's position, outlined in a request for an opinion from
the Justices, was that he would convene the Legislature in a special session
in the Fall of 1957 if the committee's work indicated that constitutional
revision and reapportionment would receive legislative approval. However,
if the committee's work seemed fruitless, he considered it his duty to
convene the Legislature in an extraordinary session, under Article VII,
section 3, to consider reapportionment. Therefore, he requested answers
to three questions:
(I) Could he, subsequent to the thirty day period mentioned
in Article VII, section 3, convene the Legislature in an extra-
ordinary reapportionment session?
(2) If not, could lie issue such a call, within the thirty day
period, for a session in the Fall?
(3) If the second question were answered in the affirmative,
and lie issued such a call, could lie retract it before the
Legislature convened if the necessity for the call were
obviated by action taken in a special session to consider
constitutional revision?
The Justices answered each question:
(1) Article VII, section 3, requires that the Governor utilize his
authority to call a reapportionment session within thirty
days after adjournment of a regular session. This constitutional
limitation does not inhibit his authority to call a special
session under Article IV, section 8.7
7. "The Governor may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the Legislature by




(2) Under Article VII, section 3, the Governor must state the
convening date of the extraordinary session in the call. The
particular date chosen is within the executive discretion;
but once fixcd in the call, it cannot be changed by the
Governor after expiration of the thirty day period following
the regular session.
(3) The Justices authorized the Governor to cancel a call, under




Legislative Authority to Convene in Special, Extraordinary, or an
Extended Session-In an advisory opinion to the Governor the Justices
stated that the Florida Constitution contained "no authorization for an
extension of an extended session" and that the Legislature had "no
inherent power to convene itself in special or extraordinary session for
any purpose." Article III, section 2, reads as follows:
The regular sixty day biennial session of the legislature may,
by a three-fifths vote of . . . both houses, be extended not
exceeding a total of thirty days which need not be consecutive.
.... No extended session may last beyond September 1st ...
The Justices construed this language to prohibit the Legislature from
extending a regular session, unless such action is taken during the regular
session. \Vhile a recess from time to time within the extended session
could be accomplished by joint house action, once the Legislature extends a
regular session for a stipulated period, it has exhausted its constitutional
authority.
The Justices specifically stated that their opinion should not be
construed to limit the legislative "self-starter" provisions of Article III,
section 2, or the power of the Governor to call the Legislature, under
Article IV, section 8, into extraordinary session.
Municipal Enactment of Zoning Ordinance Amendment a Legislative
Function-The Florida Supreme Court, in Schauer v. City. of Miami
Beach,10 classified the adoption by a city council of an amendment to
a general zoning ordinance as the exercise of a "legislative" rather than
a "quasi-judicial" function. Judicial scrutiny of the financial motivation
of an approving councilman was thereby foreclosed. Five affirmative council
votes were necessary to amend, including the affirmative vote of Councilman
8. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 96 So.2d 413 (17a. 1957). See also,
Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 88 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1956).
9. See note 6 supra.
10. 112 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1959), affirming City of Miami Beach v. Schauer, 104
So.2d 129 (Fla. App. 1958); accord: Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 188 Va. 97, 49
SE.2d 321 (1948).
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SJH. Adoption of the amendment would benefit SJI-I some several
hundred thousand dollars by reason of the impact of the zoning change
on property owned by him.
The court stated the question to be whether or not a court may
investigate the motives of a council in voting on such an amendment
to the zoning ordinance. Analogizing to the problem of a parliament -
"it is not difficult to picture the havbc that would be wrought in legislative
bodies if each member . . . could by . . . the judiciary be declared
disqualified to participate in any legislation that affected a class, race,
creed, business . . . to which he belonged"- the court limited judicial
review to votes involving "fraud or overreaching." The court was influ-
enced by the factors that "at the worst" SJH "had a selfish interest,
possibly with others similarly situated" and that "no attempt was made
by him to conceal his interest."
II. DELEGATION OF LEGISlATIVE POWER
Invalid Delegation of Municipal Legislative Power- The Third
District" invalidated a municipal licensing ordinance under which a child
day nursery had been denied an occupational license. The ordinance
required "Written certification by the Florida State Welfare Board that
said school or nursery has been approved by the . . . Board." Since the
city had not established "guides or standards" to channel the state board's
discretion, the ordinance was unconstitutional. Reference in the ordinance,
to the minimum standards established by the state board, apparently
would have sufficed. In part, the court justified its conclusion by noting
that the judiciary is unable to review administrative action unless channeled
by the legislative power.
Perhaps a more difficult case was Godshalk v. City of Winter Park.'
2
At issue was the following municipal ordinance:
For the purpose of this ordinance, the term 'Tile Contractor'
is defined to be a person who is generally engaged in the business
of planning, laying out . . . the installation of . . . tile. . . . The
board shall examine applicants as to their practical knowledge
of the installation of tile. . . . Examination shall be in whole,
or in part, in writing, and shall be a practical and elementary
character, but sufficiently strict to test the qualifications . . . to
carry on the trade . . . and to satisfy as to the applicant's ability
as such and his familiarity with rules and ordinances governing
the installation of tile ...
Plaintiff, a tile contractor, had taken and failed the examination of the
'Winter Park Tile Examining Board.
11. State v. Miami, 107 So.2d 387 (Fla. App. 1958).




The Florida Supreme Court, with Justices Drew and Thornal dissenting,
invalidated the ordinance as "leaving the granting or denial of a license
wholly within the uncontrolled discretion of the Board." Mr. Justice
Hobson's majority opinion established an interesting dichotomy in the
Florida constitutional law restricting legislative delegation of power. An
occupational licensing board apparently may be established under abstract
standards when the subjects to be tested are "academic in nature" and
the board members are "skilled" in the occupation involved, e.g., the
State Board of Pharmacy. The court judicially noticed that a tile con-
tractor's work is not based upon "academic" subjects.
Another technique of drafting a valid occupational examination
ordinance was suggested by Mr. Justice Hobson. If the examination deals
with "a definite and ascertainable set of rules," such as knowledge of city
ordinances regulating the occupation's activities, the examining board will
be operating under constitutionally definite standards.
The Referendum Requirement and Courts of Justices of the Peace-
Article V, section 11, states that:
[T]he legislature may, by special act . . . change the boundaries
of any such [justice of the peace] district . . . and may establish
new or abolish any such district. . . . Provided, however, that
any such changes shall be submitted to the people of any county
so affected, by referendum ...
The Florida Supreme Court construed this constitutional provision
to require that the legislature initially decide whether "justice districts"
within a county should be abolished, "subject to the approval of such
abolition by the electorate in a referendum election." This power to
initially decide could not be delegated to the electorate by the legislature.'3 '
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS - THE POLICE POWER
I. IN'rRODUION"
4
Substantive due process determines the governmental power to take
or regulate life, liberty or property. This constitutional inhibition does
not relate to the procedures necessary to take or regulate, but involves the
validity of the exercise of governmental power, as such. Traditionally, the
Florida Supreme Court categorizes substantive due process as a problem
relating to the breadth of the state "police power." Under Florida due
process, the "police power" must be related to the "health, safety, morals
or general welfare" of Florida citizenry. Generally speaking, this issue in
Florida constitutional law is raised procedurally by a writ or cause of
action which allows Florida courts to try, in de novo fashion, the factual
13. See County of Brevard v. Harland, 102 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1958).
14. State substantive due process remains very much alive; See, e.g., Hetherington,
State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Lawv, 53 Nw. U. L. REv.
226 (1959).
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basis for the necessity or reasonableness of the legislative police power
activity. Florida courts, at least in theory, grant judicial grace to the
legislative department by means of a "presumption of validity." This
"presumption", however, has had an uneasy career in Florida. "5
I1. RECULATION OF BIStNwssEs AFFECTED WIT A PUBLIC INTERE.SZT
In 1958, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated legislation which
prohibited public insurance adjusters from soliciting business.', Approxi-
mately 90%, of the plaintiff adjustor's business was obtained by direct
solicitation. \Vhen he learned of a loss he would contact the insured
and offer his services on a contingent fee basis.
The court stated that in order "to justify the exercise of the police
power the Legislature must be supported by some sound basis of necessity
to protect the public morals, health, safety or welfare," Then the court
appeared to throw a presumption against the validity of the statute by
stating that "freedom [of contract] is the general rule and restraint is
the exception." Legislative regulation of employment contracts must, there-
fore, "be reasonably justified by the needs of public health, safety or
welfare." Failure of the court to find, either in the record or by judicial
notice, any "reasonable basis" for the legislative restriction led to the
statute's demise under substantive due process.
Mr. Chief Justice Terrell and Justices Roberts and Thomas dissented.
Mr. Justice rhomas believed that the presumption of legislative validity
was not overcome by the factual record. Hc recognized that "while one is
in sudden unfortunate circumstances lie should not be subjected to appeals
of those who would represent him in seeking redress for his loss." Appar-
ently, the Justice found a constitutional basis for the legislative regulation
in the uncqual bargaining position of "a person in distressful circumstances
because of the loss of his property by fire." The dissenters' position would
seem to be fortified by simple reference to the traditional heavy regulation
of the particular subject matter, insurance, accommodated under substantive
due process.S
III. SAFEITY
The Third District correctly manipulated the presumption of validity
in a 1958 "safety" police power case.' Parking lot operators were denied
15. See. e.g., Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 12 U. MIAhMI L. REv. 288,
300-310 (1958).
16. See Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 Y'A.e L.J. 1089 (1930).
17. Larson v. Lesser, 106 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1958) (federal constitutional law also
argued). See Yellow Cab Co. v. Ingalls, 104 So.2d 844 (Fla. App. 1958) where the
District Court of Appeal for the Second District announced a broad police power over
certification of public transportation vehicles.
18. See, e.g., Feller v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., So.2d 581 (Fla. 1952).
19. City of Miami v. Girtmau, 104 So.2d 62 (ja. App. 1958) (hopelessly inter-
twined in decisional language was a Fourteeuth Amendment doe process argument);
State v. Blackburn, 104 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1958) (Florida and Fourteenth Amendment due
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ingress or egress, under a city ordinance, on one of the two streets running
on either side of their lot. Permission was denied "because of traffic
difficulties incident to the nearby fire station."
The court indulged in the familiar test of evaluating the "incon-
venience" to the property owner from the exercise of police power and
weighing its conclusion against "the public necessity" of "safety to the
traveling public." According the city the presumption of validity, the court
held that the facts alleged failed to state a cause of action under substantive
due process. Therefore, in such cases, more must be alleged than loss of
profits or an inconvenience to the property owner.
IV. MORALS
A 1958 decision20 upheld, against due process arguments, legislation
prohibiting the issuance of motel liquor licenses except to the owner
or lessee of the motel. Prior to enactment of the legislation, plaintiffs
purchased a liquor license from a motel owner. The effect of the law was
to disallow renewal of the license except by issuance to the motel owner
or lessee.
The Florida Supreme Court, referring to the broad police power21
traditionally exercised over the liquor industry, stated that the license
'merely" involved "a privilege" and upheld the statute.
V. POLICE POWER, GENERALLY
Limitations on Advertising Rates -City of Daytona Beach v. Abdo22
raised the constitutional problem which normally involves a zoning regu-
lation that can be sustained by Florida courts as a concern of aesthetics.
However, in this decision the First District characterized the function of
an ordinance, prohibiting "outside" rate advertising for tourist accommoda-
tions, as maintenance of the city's attractiveness, yet unrelated to zoning.
Nevertheless, the ordinance was upheld.
The opinion is interesting, in view of the Florida Supreme Court's
distaste for municipal regulations designed to alleviate financial hardships
flowing from unrestrictcd competitive practices within an industry. By
process argued) exemplifies the reluctance of the Florida Supreme Court to adhere to
its stated presumption of validity. A state statute made it unlawful to display a sign
advertising the retail price of gasoline within fifteen feet of the right-of-way of any
public street. The court simply rejected the state's argument that "obstruction of public
streets" is "a dangerous practice because the driver's attention is diverted" thereby. The
decision is difficult to rationalize because the due process concept is undifferentiated from
the equal protection concept. Apparently a state prohibition of all signs would survive.
The court's factual argumentation seemed to be predicated upon judicial notice.
20. Leafer v. State, 104 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1958) (impossible to distinguish federal
and state due process arguments); likewise, the obligation of contracts argument failed.
21. E.g., Pickeril] v. Schott, 55 So.2d 716 (Fla. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 815
(1952).
22. 112 So.2d 398 (Fla. App. 1959) (Chief Judge Sturgis dissented). Cf. Interna-
tional Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 90 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1956).
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relating "price war" signs to a "honky-tonk [municipal] appearance" the
district court was able to validate the ordinance by reference to Florida
Supreme Court phraseology favorable to zoning restrictions based upon
aesthetic considerations.
Regulation of a Profession: Accountants - In 1957, legislation designed
to establish a regulated profession for "accountants" was held unconstitu-
tional by the Florida Supreme Court.2a Under a rule of the State Board
of Accountancy, authorized by the statute, only certificated individuals
could utilize the title of "accountant" in preference to that of "bookkeeper"
(one who serves as a part-time employee for one or more employers).
First, the court judicially noticed the needs of small businessmen for
ordinary acounting work and the relatively small number of accountants,
certificated by the Board and practicing in the State. Weighing "the
needs of small businesses" and "the fundamental right of all . . . to enter
into contracts of personal employncnt" against "the right of the state...
to regulate the practice of accountancy . . ." the 6urt 'determined that
the police power failed under substantive due process standards. Conse-
quently, non-certificated individuals have a constitutional right to call
themselves "accountants" rather than "bookkeepers."
Ignoring the court's failure to grant constitutional grace under the
presumption of validity, one could criticize this decision on more pragmatic
grounds. Why limit the professional monopolies- regulated severely in the
public interest - to the classic professions, such as medicine or law?
Perhaps a mistake in "bookkeeping" may be as disastrous to the businessman
who pays taxes as a pleading error to the businessman who sues. Judicial
reliance on the "right to contract" phrase neatly avoids the social problem
facing a "trade" which aspires to professionalize its standards and effectuate
its code of conduct.24 Florida due process, it would seem, should be able
to accommodate guild efforts unknown at Common Law.
Differentiation between the Eminent Domain and the General Police
Power- Two important decisions were rendered by the Florida Supreme
Court which limited state destruction of private property, without com-
pensation to the owner. In Cornical v. State Plant Board,2 the court
considered the constitutionality of the State Plant Board's "pull and treat"
23. Florida Accountants Ass'n v. Dandelake, 98 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1957) (Justices
itobson and Drew dissented); the decision can be read as a thrust at a CPA monopoly
effort, invalid under due process. Also mentioned was a denial of equal protection to
the uncertified practitioners. Recently a court of appeals of another state took a
contrary approach with somewhat similar legislation, Pitts v. State Board of Examiners
of Psychologists, 160 A.2d 200 (Md. 1960). In Dandelake v. Florida Accountants Ass'n,
108 So.2d '46 (Fla. 1959), the Florida Supreme Court vacated its original decree and
remanded tIre cause for further consideration by the lower court, after the appellate
court was apprised of legislation (Fla. Laws, Ch. 57-273, 1957) which might have led
the trial court to a different decision.
24. The Rules of Professional Conduct (American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants 1958) regulating CPA activities would appear to be a sincere attempt to
parallel standard bar ethics.
25. 95 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1957) (Fourteenth Amendment due process argued also).
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program under section 12 of the Declaration of Rights to the Florida
Constitution, which rcquires that private property shall not be taken
"without just compensation."
The legislature declared "a public nuisance" of any "plant or other
thing infested" with the "burrowing nematode," or anything "exposed
to infestation." An "emergency" condition was recognized by the legislature
in the citrus industry because of the "spreading decline" caused by the
"burrowing nematode." The Board authorized removal and burning in
all infested citrus zones, plus "the first four trees past the last . . affected
tree .. ..
The plaintiff grove owners complained that the Board's program
for their grove would destroy 197 citrus trees of which only 16 were
actually infected. If the court classified the legislative program within the
orbit of state police power, compensation need not be paid the owners;
however, classification under eminent domain would require compensation
by the State. The record related conflicting expert testimony as to the
state of "emergency" and the cfficacy of the "pull and treat" program. The
court's opinion did not disagree directly with the legislative fact finding,
but did require compensation to be paid the grove owner for destruction of
"healthy trees" which, while not infected, had been exposed to infection.
Only in extreme emergencies would the court's rationale permit state
destruction of private property to protect property of a "neighbor."
Eminent domain requirements, therefore, demanded payment; the state's
police power, exercised without compensation, failed.
Federal constitutional law, of course, marches the other way.2 6 This
may be explained by a natural reluctance on the part of the United States
Supreme Court to force state legislatures to cease evaluating which of
two classes of property must be destroyed to save the other - which, in
other words, has more value to the state's economy. For rare will be the
state sufficiently wealthy to compensate the owners of one or the other
classes.
The second decision also involved the "pull and treat" program of
the State Plant Board. In State Plant Board v. Smith,27 the Florida Supreme
* Court thoughtfully distinguished between state action under the police
power and state action sounding in eminent domain. In this connection
the court construed the constitutional significance of Article XVI, section 29
and Declaration of Rights, section 12. Article XVI, section 29, prohibits
the taking of private property for public use unless full compensation
is made to the owner. Declaration of Rights, section 12, states that private
property shall not be taken without just compensation. The following
principles apparently limit state power:
26. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (Fourteenth Amendment due process
argued).
27. 110 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1959) (Fourteenth Amendment due process argued also).
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(1) Eminent domain is a "compulsory purchase of the property
of a citizen when such property is to be appropriated to a
public purpose for use . ..' State condemnation of property
for a highway would seem to meet this definition.
(2) Article XVI, section 29, only regulates exercise of the eminent
domain power.
(3) State regulation of property (such as zoning requirements) or
state destruction of property as a "public nuisance" is an
exercise of the state police power.
(4) Declaration of Rights, section 12, necessitates compensation
to the owner of property sought to be destroyed by the state,
under its police power (3, above), when the Florida Supreme
Court requires that result.
The statutory framework authorizing fle Board's "pull and treat"
program was classified as an attempted exercise of state police power.
'lhe court invalidated this legislation in the following details:
(1) in so far as the Legislature tried to limit compensation to
owners of uninfected trees to $1000 per acrc.
(2) the legislative determination that no compensation should be
made to owners of infected trees, even if the trees were still"commercially profitable."
Declaration of Rights, section 12, with other constitutional phases not
relevant here, was stated by the court to require this result. The decision
may make it impossible for the legislature to finance the eradication
program, but the court did not discuss the economics involved.
EQUAL PROTEICTION
The Florida Constitution's Declaration of Rights, section 1, which
reads that "all mcin are equal before the law..." would seem to be
our equal protection inhibition. Scveral judicial invalidations occurred under
this phrase during the present Survey ycars. The Florida Supreme Court's
approach to review of legislative classification problems is quite similar
to its revicw of the legislative police power under substantive due process:
in both situations the court demands a "reasonable" basis for the legislative
judgment. The presumption of legislative validity receives a judicial
"lip-service" which somewhat awes one familiar with federal court
review practices.
28
Standard to Invalidate under Florida Equal Protection - rhe legisla-
lure must deteruminc the applicability of statutes under a classification
which has "some just relation to, or reasonable basis in, essential differences
of conditions and circumstances with reference to the subject regulated,
and should not be merely arbitrary....'' Further, "all similarly situated ...
28. See, e.g., Gustafson v. City of Ocala, 53 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1951).
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should be included in one class, at least where there are no practical
differences that are sufficient to . . .warrant a . . . special classification
in the . . . general welfare."29 Abstractions such as "reasonable," "arbitrary,"
"practical," and "general welfare" necessitate court evaluation of the facts
in the case record or the facts acknowlcdged by judicial notice. Under
these vague standards judicial legislation will necessarily run riot unless
the court rigorously adheres to the presumption of validity. Examination
of the recent equal protection cases indicates that the legislative judgment
is running a poor second to judicial judgment.
Naturopathy Legislation-0 -The legislature in 1927 authorized a state
board to license naturopaths. A 1957 act abolished the state board and
forbade further licensing. In this act an unusual classification was established;
presently licensed naturopaths were divided into three classes:
(1) those who had practiced naturopathy for fifteen years and over.
(2) those who had practiced between two and fifteen years.
(3) those who had practiced less than two years.
Under the 1957 act classes (1) and (2) could renew their licenses annually;
class (3) could no longer practice naturopathy. The obvious intent of the
legislation was to eliminate naturopathy medicine at some future date
when everyone in classes (1) and (2) had ceased .the practice. Plaintiff
was a class (2) naturopath who sued to invalidate this legislation because
of the privileges granted therein to class (1); only class (1) naturopaths
were authorized to continue prescribing and administering drugs.
The Florida Supreme Court viewed this arrangement as creating "a
closed class" within a "closed class," the former being those naturopaths
practicing more than two years and the latter being those practicing at
least fifteen years. The "unequal" legislative treatment of the two classes
was determined not to be "reasonable" since members of both classs
"take the same training and pass the same examination." Further, there
was no provision for class (2) to be examined to ascertain whether the
members were equally qualified with class (1) members.
It would seem obvious that the legislature intended to protect our
citizens from the consequences of medical treatment by a branch of
medicine legislatively determined unqualified. Likewise, the legislative
classification probably was created by the necessity of political maneuvering
on the part of the bill's sponsors. Perhaps, as the court inferred, a "grand-
father" clause would have been constitutionally proper; perhaps, also, it
would have been easier to negotiate through the legislature. But under a
"grandfather" arrangemcnt class (2) naturopaths would have continued to
29. See Eslin v. Collins, 108 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1959) (apparently both the Federal
and State equal protection statements were construed); petition for rehearing was denied
per curialn, with a dissent by Mr, justice Thornal.
30. Ibid.
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administer drugs to Florida citizens. Judicial understanding of the legislative
process, plus rigid adherence to the presumption of validity would seem
particularly efficacious when the legislature acts under the health police
power.
Real Estate Broker's License Requirements:" -Again the legislative
judgment was frustrated, but perhaps under more reasonable circumstances.
Every applicant for a real estate broker's license, in "counties having a
population of not less than 260,000 according to the last Federal census,"
had to demonstrate to the Real Estate Commission that lie had "served
an apprenticeship as a salesman . . .with a Registered Broker for not less
than 12 months." Only Dade County met the statutory conditions. The
Florida Supreme Court insisted that such a regulation must have state-wide
application "unless some valid basis for classification clearly appears." None
was discovered and the statute was invalidated. The rationale of the legisla-
tive classification was not discussed in the opinion, but it is probable that
the regulation was imposed on Dade County applicants because of a
surfeit of real estate brokers therein.
It should be noted, however, that such a rationale, appearing in the
record, undoubtedly would have been the basis for an invalidation under
substantive due process .
3 2
Sunday Laws-It would appear that it is impossible, under the
Florida Constitution, for the Legislature to enact a valid Sunday Law. Under
one constitutional provision or another the Florida Supreme Court, faced
with such a law, inevitably responds by an invalidation. 33 Recently on
the judicial block were Florida Statutes, sections 855.01 and 855.02:
(I) Section 855.01 reads as follows: "Whoever follows any pursuit,
business or trade on Sunday . . . unless the same be a work
of necessity, shall be punished . . . provided, however, that
nothing contained in the laws ... shall . . prohibit
printing any newspaper . . . [nor] shall tthis section]
apply to theaters in which moving pictures are shown."
(2) Section 855.02 reads as follows: "Whoever keeps open store...
on Sunday . . . shall be punished. . . .In cases of emergency
or necessity, however, merchants . . . and others may dispose
of the comforts and necessities of life . ..without keeping
open doors."
The court invalidated, stating that "it is necessary that there be a valid and
substantial reason to make such laws operate only upon certain classes
rather than generally upon all." It was not sufficient that the laws
31. Staic ;. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 99 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1957) (petition for
rehearing had been granted).
32. Cf. Lippow v. City of Miami Beach, 68 So.2d 827, 829 (Fla. 1953).
33. Kelly v. Blackburn, 95 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1957), was the latest case; see also, e.g.,
Henderson v, Antonacci, 62 So.2d 5 (Fa. 1952). Cf. Commonwealth v. Cavalerro,
28 U.S.L. VIEK 2551 (Pa. C.P. April 20, 1960).
[Voi- XIV
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
operated "equally upon all within a certain class or classes." The Justices
were unable to find a "substantial reason" to uphold the legislative
classification.3
4
FREEDOMS OF SPEECH, PRESS, ASSEMBLY AND RELIGION
Speech - Florida constitutional law apparently requires procedural due
process to be satisfied by private clubs which expel members. 35 The next
logical step, however, was not taken when the First District refused
to monitor the basis for expulsion of a member from a private club. The
member argued that he had been denied his property under substantive
due process, and that his freedom of speech was abridged, by the club
action. The court carefully distinguished between substantive rights of
members of unions or professional organizations and members of private
clubs; only rights of the former, under due process and freedom of speech,
will be given constitutional protection.'(0
Press-An interesting case, involving a conflict between freedom of
press and judicial power, arose in Dade County in 1959." Circuit Judge
Giblin entered the following order:
[I] enter this order, in the exercise of the court's inherent
power, for the purpose of insuring that the proceedings before
me ...shall be conducted in an atmosphere of dignity ...with
due regard for the rights and privileges of the accused.
. [N]o photographs ... shall be taken during the proceedings
before me .. .in the courtroom or at any place within thirty (30)
feet of any entrance ...[thereto]; and . . . the accused shall not
be photographed in the jail preceding his arraignment, or in his
way to or from the court session during which he is to be
arraigned, or in the courtroom. The accused has specifically objected
to being so photographed. . . .A violation by any photographer
. .who shall have notice of this order ...shall . . . be deemed
...as contempt of this court ...
The prisoner had been indicted for rape and there had been "extensive
local publicity concerning his arrest and past criminal record." In an
obvious attempt to test the validity of Judge Giblin's order, one appellant
took motion pictures of the prisoner on the 19th floor of the courthouse,
34. Somewhat analogous was State v. Blackburn, 104 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1958) (the
decision is difficult to understand; it may relate to due process and/or equal protection,
under the state and/or federal constitutions). See also Florida Accountants Ass'n v.
Dandelake, sopra note 23, at 329, and Kass v. Lewin, 104 Sn.2d 572 (Fla. 1958)
(federal and state eqtal protection clauses argued, along with other constitutional
provisions). The present survey article on Florida Property discusses this decision.
35. Cf. La Gorce Country Club v. Cerami, 74 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 1954).
36. See State v. Florida Yacht Club, 106 So.2d 207 (Fla. App. 1958), cert. denied,
Ill So.2d 40 (Fla. 1959) (procedural due process is stated as a constitutional
requirement, also).
37. Brumnfield v. State, 108 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1958) (Appellants argued the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and the Declaration of Rights,
section 13 of the Florida Constitution. The court, as usual, failed to distinguish between
the two constitutions).
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as the prisoner was brought from an elevator which led to the detention
area. 'The other appellant took photographs for television of the prisoner
a short distance from the entrance of the courtroom in which the prisoner
was to be arraigned. The Judge immediately cited appellants for contempt
of court.
Section 13 of the Declaration of Rights to the Florida Constitution 8
was construed by the Florida Supreme Court so that newspaper and television
photography were not constitutionally sanctified, at least under the circum-
stances of the present case. Views on this subject are prolific and con-
flicting;3 1 however, the author believes that the court's conclusion will be
an attractive one to anyone familiar with the massive news media coverage
typically given in Dade County to such trials.
The court thoughtfully analyzed the constitutional possibilities involved
The '"public trial" concept 40 apparently was limited to attendance by
the public at the trial. then, a distinction was drawn between regulating
freedom of expression and regulating access to information of matters of
public interest. Freedom of press rights were accorded only to the former.
Therefore, a trial court may regulate access to persons in custody, but it
may not penalize expression.
Having successfully sailed past these constitutional bars, the court con-
structcd a power source to enable trial courts to regulate the "entire process"
of a criminal proceeding, to the end that justice be administered to grant
the defendant a "fair trial." The trial court was found to have a duty,
as a facet of its inherent judicial power, to control the administration of
justice in the case before it. In imposing regulations to achieve this end,
the trial court's order must be "reasonably required for the orderly
administration of justice." Under the facts of the present case, the court
determined that Judge Giblin's order was reasonable because publication
of more photographs wvould "senc only to increase the already large volume
of publicity concerning the case," to the detriment of a "fair trial for
the accused."
Left for future determination were (among others) several problems:
(1) If a defendant did not object to photographs would a prohibi-
tive court order be valid?
(2) Does a defendant have a personal right to privacy?
(3) May the court, during the trial, regulate photographic tech-
niques which are not distracting?
38. "Every person may fully speak and write his sentiments on all subjects being
responsible for the abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press."
39. See, e.g., Fair Trial and Freedom of the Press, 19 F.R.D. 16 (1955). See also,
Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Grimes, 28 U.S,L. Wr.i,-K 2564 (Ga. Sup. Ct. May 5, 1960)
(a Georgia court order, similar to judge Giblin's, sustained).
40. FLA. ConxsT. Dcl. of Rights, § 11: 'accused shall have the right to a speedy
and public trial .. "
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(4) May news media coverage be regulated which comments upon
events occurring during any. part of the "entire process" of
criminal justice administration?
Religion - An executor requested a declaratory decree construing a
will containing the following item:
[A devise of a parcel of land to Orange County for usc as a
public park, provided that] the Church now located in the vicinity
shall have the privilege of baptizing persons in the lake and also
the young people of the Church are not to be denied the privilege
of swimming . . in the lake.
Section 6 of the Declaration of Rights to the Florida Constitution provides
that:
No preference shall be given by law to any church . . . and no
money shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or
indirectly in aid of any church ...
The Florida Supreme Court declared the issue to be whether the
county could accept the land with a perpetual easement to use it and
the lake for "baptismal purposes." Section 6 was construed to permit
acceptance of the gift under the theory "any improvement to county owned
land will be made for the benefit of the people of the county and not
for the church." 41
METROPOLITAN GO\'ERNMENT 42
In November, 1956, the state electorate adopted an amendment to
the Florida Constitution, Article VII, Section 11, which provided "home
rule" for Dade County in local affairs. Pursuant to this amendment, Dade
County adopted a Metropolitan Charter establishing a county manager
form of government and an enlarged county commission which exercises
legislative power. The Charter was destined to provoke litigation by persons
holding public office prior to "home rule" and by several of Dade County's
twenty-six municipalities which were fearful of losing some of their
sovereignty to the new type of county government.
In Dade County v. Kelly, 43 the county commission by ordinance
"transferred to the [newly created] Public Safety Department the duties,
functions and powers of the County Police and County Fire Departments
and all functions of the sheriff of Dade County except the service of civil
process." The Sheriff of Dade County challenged the constitutionality of
the ordinance. The Florida Supreme Court held that the county con-
41. Koerner v. Borck, 100 So.2d 398 (Fla. 1958) (First Amendment argued also).
Accord, Fenske v. Coddington, 57 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1952). Cf. Bradfield v. Roberts,
175 U.S. 291 (1899) (analogous First Amendment problem).
42. This section was written by Michael C. Slotnick, University of Miami School of
Law, 1960.
43. 99 So.2d 856 (Fla. 1957).
1960]
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missions under the "home rule" amendment must abolish the office of
County Sheriff as a condition precedent to the transfer of its functions
and that a piecemeal transfer of functions while the office is still in
existence "transcends the amendment." The practical effect of this decision
was that Kelly, the elected sheriff of Dade County, who under constitutional
requirements must serve until his elected term expired, could not be
limited in his functions to a mere process server,
In Chase v. Cowart," the Florida Supreme Court upheld a Metropolitan
Charter provision which abolished. the legislation which created the Dade
County Budget Commission, since it was a board "whose jurisdiction lies
wholly within Dade County." However, the court, in the same decision, held
ineffective an act of the Florida Legislature45 insofar as it attempted to
ratify, affirm and validate the Metropolitan Charter. The rationale was that
this legislation, although passed as a general act, was, in fact, a special act
applicable only to Dade County. With the adoption of the "home rIhe"
anendment and the Metropolitan Charter, the legislature became powerless
to enact special legislation for Dade County.
In Dade County v. Dade County League of Municipalities,"' the Florida
Supreme Court permitted a municipal autonomy amendment to the Metro-
politan Charter to be presented to the Dade County electorate, Mr. Justice
Thornal, speaking for the majority, stated:
If the people in [Dade County] desire Home Rule in its broadest
and most completely unrestricted sense, it is theirs to adopt so
long as they comply with the provisions of the organic law. On
the other hand, and subject only to the same limitation, they
can have limited Home Rule. Finally, by the same token, if they
desire no Home Rule at all, it is for them to decide ...
The autonomy amendment was subsequently defeated by the voters of
Dade County.
In Dade County v. Young Democratic Club of Dade County,47 the
sections of the Metropolitan Charter providing for non-partisan election
of county commissioners were upheld.
Perhaps the most significant decision pertaining to Dade County's
experiment in local government, during the present Survey years, was Miami
Shores Village v. Cowart, 4" wherein an ordinance enacted by the county
commission establishing uniformity of traffic control and enforcement
throughout the entire metropolitan area was validated by the Florida
Supreme Court. In reaching this result the court employed the following
standard:
44. 102 So.2d 147 (fla. 1958).
45. FIa. Laws, Ch. 57-912, 1957.
46, 104 Sold 512 (fla. 1958).
47. 104 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1958).
48. 108 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1958).
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IW]e construe the .. .I-Ione Rule Amendment as requiring theMetropolitan] Charter to provide for municipal utonomy as to
the purely local functions or powers of the municipalities in Dade
County; and as authorizing regulation and control by the Board
on a county-wide basis of those municipal functions and services
that are susceptible to, and could be most effectively carried on
under, a uniform plan of regulation applicable to the county as a
whole.
AMENDING PROCESS
A 1958 decision, Rivera-Cruz v. Gray4 abrogated the most recent effort
to revise the Florida Constitution. The Secretary of State was enjoined from
placing a comprehensive revision of the Constitution on the ballot in the
1958 general election.
Proposed amendments to the constitution were incorporated in fourteen
legislative joint resolutions; these were intended to revise each article of
the constitution except one. The amendments contained in the resolutions
were stated to be interdependent in that, unless each was approved, all
failed. This was characterized as the "Daiscy-chain" amending process.
Two provisions of the Florida Constitution were in issue. The first
Article XVII, section 2, relates the method for revising the Constitution.
Under it the legislature may determine that a revision is desirable and
permit the electorate to vote for or against the revision. Assuming a favorable
electoral vote, the legislature must provide for a revision convention. The
convention is, then, given the power to revise.
The second provision, Article XVII, section 1, provides for legislatively
inspired amendments to be submitted to the electorate. Assuming a favor-
able electoral vote, the amendments become part of the Constitution.
The precise issue in the Rivera-Cruz case was whether or not a
constitutional revision can be accomplished by the Article XVII, section 1,
procedure. The Florida Supreme Court thought not, under the theory that
the procedure for amendments in Section 1 and the procedure for revision
in section 2 are independent of each other; therefore, the simpler amending
procedure of section 1 cannot be utilized to revise the Constitution. Revision
of the instrument could not be achieved through "interlocking" amendments.
A distinction between amending, which is a "change of parts," and
revision, which is "a recasting of the whole constitution," was drawn.
This led to invalidation of the proposed revision methodology.
MISCELLANY
Florida Constitution, Article XIX, authorizes local option in counties,
with reference to the sale of intoxicating beverages. Legislation regulating
-49. 104 So.2d 501 (Fa, 1958) Mr. Chief Justice Terrell and Mr. Justice Thornal
concurred specially with opinion). See also Pope v. Cray, 104 So.2d 841 (Fla. 1958);
Gray v. Golden, 89 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1956).
1960)
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issuance of liquor licenses was construed by the Florida Supreme Court
to prohibit the sale of liquor in some cities having a population of less
than 1,251 persons, thereby creating dry areas iil a "wet" county. The
court upheld the legislation under the rationale that Article XIX does
not require that liquor be sold in every area of a "wet" county.50
50. State v. Cochran, 112 So.2d I (Fla. 1959).
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